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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
STATE V. PAYNE: POLICE OFFICER NEEDED TO BE
QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS TO
THE FUNCTION OF CELL PHONE TOWERS; CODEFENDANTS ARE NOT A PARTY OPPONENTS FOR
HEARSAY PURPOSES.
By: Allison Terry
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a police officer testifying as to
the methods used to place a defendant near a crime scene through the use of
cell phone towers and call logs must be qualified as an expert witness. State
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 718, 104 A.3d 142, 164 (2014). The court further held
that statements made by a criminal co-defendant will not be admissible under
a hearsay exception as a statement of a party opponent under Maryland Rule
5-803(a)(1). Id. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in admitting
the statement of a co-defendant as that of a co-conspirator. Id.
Officers discovered a body on fire in the woods. Early investigation led
detectives to the cell phone records of Desmond Jones (“Jones”), who later
testified about the decision to burn the victim’s body. Using these records,
investigators identified numbers associated with Joseph William Payne
(“Payne”) and Jason Bond (“Bond”) as pertinent to their investigation.
Detective Brian Edwards (“Edwards”) obtained subpoenas for Payne and
Bond’s cell phone records. During trial, Edwards testified, without being
qualified as an expert witness, as to his use of the defendants’ cell phone
records to determine their location on the night of the crime.
The prosecution offered into evidence six telephone calls between Bond
and various individuals regarding an alibi for the night of the murder against
both Payne and Bond. In these conversations, Bond discussed the use of a
fabricated alibi placing himself and Payne with Brittany Keller (“Keller”) and
others the night of the murder. Payne was not on the phone for any of these
calls. At trial, Keller testified about her face-to-face meeting with Payne.
The trial court convicted Payne and Bond in a joint trial for first degree
felony murder and other related crimes. The trial court found that Edwards’s
testimony did not require him to be qualified as an expert. Further, the trial
court found the six phone conversations were admissible against Payne under
the co-conspirator hearsay exception provided by Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(5).
The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
which reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial. The intermediate
appellate court held that the trial court erred in admitting Edwards’s testimony
because he should have been qualified as an expert witness. The intermediate
appellate court also found the wiretapped phone calls admissible against
Payne; however, the phone calls were held admissible under Maryland Rule
5-803(a)(1) as admissions of a party opponent rather than under Maryland
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Rule 5-803(a)(5) as statements of a co-conspirator. The State then filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing
whether Edwards needed to be qualified as an expert witness. Payne, 440 Md.
at 685, 104 A.3d at 144. The court discussed Maryland Rules 5-701 and 5702, which govern the admission of opinion testimony and expert testimony,
respectively. Id. at 698-700, 104 A.3d at 153. Maryland Rule 5-702 provides
that expert testimony “may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. at 698, 104 A.3d
at 153 (citing Maryland Rule 5-701). Further, expert testimony will be
admitted when a juror would have to rely on speculation and conjecture rather
than actual understanding of the subject matter. Id. at 699, 104 A.3d at 153.
The court analyzed Edwards’s testimony using precedent requiring police
officers to be qualified as experts where they characterized interactions as drug
transactions. Payne, 440 Md. at 699, 104 A.3d at 153-54 (citing Ragland v.
State, 385 Md. 706, 725-26, 870 A.2d 609, 620 (2005)). In Ragland, the court
found that the officers’ opinions were based on their time spent studying the
drug trade, therefore requiring knowledge superior to that of a lay person. Id.
In the case sub judice, the court similarly found that Edwards’s methods used
to reach his conclusion were beyond the knowledge of a lay person and
required additional training and experience. Id. at 701, 104 A.3d at 154.
Specifically, the court determined that Edwards could not reach his
conclusions by simply reading the records and following directions provided
by the cell phone carrier. Id. Therefore, the court held that the prosecution
needed to qualify Edwards as an expert due to the complicated nature of cell
phone towers and the manner in which Edwards used the cell phone records.
Id. at 702, 104 A.3d at 155.
The court next analyzed the admissibility of the wiretapped statements
between Bond and other individuals as evidence against Payne under the party
opponent hearsay exception. Payne, 440 Md. at 703, 104 A.3d at 155. The
party opponent hearsay exception allows for the admission of a person’s own
statement “in either an individual or representative capacity,” which mirrors
the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence. Id. at 709, 104 A.3d at 159
(quoting Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1))(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 801(d)(2)(A)). While
there is a lack of judicial interpretation regarding the Maryland Rule, federal
courts have held that a criminal co-defendant does not qualify as a party
opponent; only the government is a party opponent in criminal cases. Id.
(citing United States v. Hardwood, 998 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1989)(per curiam)). Using this,
the court found that in the instant case the State was Payne’s only opponent;
thus, the wiretaps were improperly admitted against Bond as statements of a
party opponent. Id. at 710, 140 A.3d at 159.
The court then addressed whether the wiretapped statements could be
admitted as statements of a co-conspirator. Payne, 440 Md. at 710, 104 A.3d
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at 159-60. The co-conspirator exception allows admittance of a statement
made by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at
724 n.3, 140 A.3d at 169 n.3 (quoting Md. Rule 5-803(a)). To be admissible,
the proponent must make a prima facie showing of conspiracy and prove the
opposing party’s assent to the conspiracy. Id. at 712-13, 140 A.3d at 161
(citing State v. Johnson, 367 Md. 418, 424, 788 A.2d 628, 632 (2002)). In
determining assent to the conspiracy, the commission of one crime does not
automatically establish consent to a second conspiracy to then cover up the
first crime. Id. at 712, 104 A.3d at 161 (citing State v. Rivenbark, 311 Md.
147, 158, 533 A.2d 271, 276 (1987)). However, if the parties agree at the
outset to engage in a second conspiracy to conceal the crime, statements made
in the context of this conspiracy are admissible. Id. (citing Rivenbark, 311
Md. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276). The court determined the evidence was
sufficient to establish the requisite prima facie showing of a conspiracy. Id. at
718, 533 A.3d at 165. Despite this, the court concluded that neither Jones nor
Keller’s testimony was sufficient to establish Payne’s assent. Id. at 713-14,
104 A.3d at 161-62. Although both Keller and Jones’s testimony reflected
Payne’s involvement of the crime, neither demonstrated any assent to enter
into the conspiracy. Id.
Finally, the court considered whether the State could play the recordings at
the joint trial as evidence against Bond without violating Payne’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Payne, 440 Md. at 714, 104 A.3d at 714. The court found
that the statements made in the wiretapped conversations were nontestimonial. Therefore, the court held that the wiretapped conversations did
not implicate the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 717-18, 104 A.3d at 164.
Nevertheless, the trial court must consider on remand the adequacy of a
cautionary instruction or joinder to protect Payne’s rights. Id.
In Payne, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that statements of a codefendant cannot be admitted under the party opponent or co-conspirator
hearsay exceptions. The court also held that a police officer testifying
regarding the interpretation of cell phone records should be qualified as an
expert. Practitioners will have to keep in mind the possibility of qualifying
officers as expert witnesses, or providing a second expert witness to explain
the technology, when cell phone towers are used during investigations. This
requirement is likely to prove troublesome for lower income or indigent clients
who may not be able to shoulder the added expense of acquiring an expert
witness to combat the expert testimony of a police officer.

